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SURGICAL ETHICS CHALLENGES
Withdrawal of life-sustaining low-burden care
Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, Bruce W. Richman, MA, and James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA ,
Houston, Tex
A 90-year-old diabetic man with unreconstructable peripheral vascular disease, end-stage chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease, relentless ischemic rest pain, and severe disability returns to your clinic asking you to deactivate his implanted
pacemaker. To do so would likely precipitate his demise, and you ask him if he is aware of this. He tells you that he is and
that he has been considering this request since he last saw you 3 months ago. Relief of his chronic pain would require
bilateral hip-disarticulating amputations, procedures with a prohibitively high operative mortality rate, particularly with
his age and comorbidities. He has been evaluated by a psychiatrist and found to be mentally competent. His treatment by
a pain specialist, who used his full armamentarium of high-dose narcotics, electronic devices, nerve blocks, and
psychological techniques, has been unsuccessful. You do not reside in Oregon. What is your most ethical course of action?
(J Vasc Surg 2005;42:176-7.)Technology is a way of organizing the universe so that man
doesn’t have to experience it.
—Max Frisch, Homo Faber, 1957.
A. Comply with his request.
B. Inform him that barbiturates are the preferred drugs for
suicide, and give him a prescription.
C. Refer him to a physician practicing in Oregon who will
comply.
D. Seek emergency commitment to a psychiatric inpatient
unit, with suicide precautions.
E. Tell him that you cannot violate good medical practice
by an action that would be harmful.
Advances in medical technology often have replaced a
“natural death” in the United States with various life-
prolonging therapies. The artificial extension of life against
disease or injury during the last century was not only
approved legally and ethically, but also became mandatory
medical practice. Prolonging life was the supreme measure
of success. Beginning in the last two decades and still
evolving, examination of when to use life-support technol-
ogies, when to discontinue them, and who should make
those decisions is an essential ethical issue in modern med-
ical practice.
It is well established in both law and the medical ethics
of informed consent that a competent adult patient is
entitled to accept or refuse a proposed medical therapy. It is
similarly well accepted in law and ethics that a competent
adult patient has the right to decline continued administra-
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176tion of an ongoing treatment modality. Most often, pa-
tients exercise this right by discontinuing their own medi-
cations or no longer appearing for scheduled follow-up
visits. When patients elect to discontinue treatment with-
out further notifying their physician, the physician has no
ethical basis for intruding on the decision. Medical pater-
nalism has been out of favor for at least half a century.
Competent adult patients likewise may refuse intensive
treatment that necessitates the close involvement of their
physicians. A patient hospitalized in a surgical intensive care
unit, intubated and on a ventilator, is entitled to refuse
further mechanical ventilator support. The surgeon in such
cases is ethically and legally obligated to ensure that the
patient understands that imminent death will be the likely
consequence of that decision if it is implemented. The
patient should also be advised of any pain and discomfort
associated with discontinuation of therapy, and the physi-
cian should offer help in reducing these undesired side
effects. Should the competent adult patient remain com-
mitted to withdrawal of care, even life-sustaining care, the
physician should promptly order palliation and extubation
as requested. Patients also have the right to make and
record such decisions in advance directives before they
contract terminal or irreversible conditions and can no
longer make decisions for themselves. Nevertheless, our
patient’s pacemaker is neither the source of his intolerable
discomfort, nor a cause of additional pathology, nor in and
of itself burdensome for him to endure.1,2 His pacemaker is
physiologically effective in maintaining normal heart func-
tion.3 Should this affect his right to insist that his physician
discontinue the treatment?
This patient’s current quality of life is not acceptable to
him and cannot be significantly improved by medical treat-
ment. He is miserable continually and is, in the terminology
of our psychiatric colleagues, anhedonic: he is no longer
able to experience happiness. His pain can be mitigated
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well his ability to act and interact within his environment.
Quality of life is a subjective measure of an individual’s
ability to engage in chosen activities and to derive satisfac-
tion from them.4 The determination of an individual’s
quality of life is not an expert judgment; indeed, external
observers tend to underestimate quality of life when com-
pared with patient self-evaluations.5 This patient’s ability to
engage in valued activities and emotions has been thor-
oughly nullified by the severity and persistence of his pain
and disability. Although physiologically successful in ex-
tending his life, ongoing pacemaker management is quali-
tatively futile for this patient.6 Is it ethically defensible, or
desirable, to permit a patient to lapse into death by meeting
his request to terminate a life-sustaining treatment that
causes him no pain, inconvenience, or dangerous side ef-
fects because, in his estimation, his chronic disease pro-
cesses have utterly and irremediably destroyed the quality
of his life?7
Option B is not an appropriate response to this ques-
tion, constituting as it does a physician-assisted suicide,
which is illegal in all states but Oregon. Violating the law by
writing an intentionally lethal prescription constitutes nei-
ther principled civil disobedience nor an expression of
moral purpose, and no moral authority attaches to it. The
State of Oregon limits access to the provisions of its Death
With Dignity Act to bona fide residents of the state. Out-
of-state referrals cannot call on Oregon physicians to assist
them in ending their lives, even when other criteria are met.
Option C is therefore not available as a remedy for this
patient.
The patient has been psychiatrically evaluated and
found to be mentally competent and, as such, is not a
legitimate candidate for involuntary commitment to inpa-
tient care and the highly restrictive measures associated
with suicide precautions. Clearly these steps will do nothing
to answer his complaints of intolerable chronic pain or his
progressive physiological disease processes. They would
actually say more about your attitude toward patients’
deaths and your morbidity/mortality statistics than about
your concern for patients’ suffering and would represent a
misuse of the psychiatric commitment process, which in
most states requires that a court can order involuntary
hospitalization only when a patient is dangerous to himself
or others by virtue of mental illness. Despite his very
advanced age, the patient has shown no evidence on formal
examination, or in his interactions with you, of cognitive or
affective deficit. Although his conclusions may be debated
and, indeed, are the subject of our debate, this patient has
made a rational decision to end his suffering by ending his
life. Option D is therefore not an ethically acceptable
selection.
Many physicians would elect option E, explaining to
the patient that a physician cannot ethically perform a
medical procedure that would be harmful to a patient.
Modern medicine challenges the concept of natural death.
In considering requests for hastened death by terminally ill
patients with overwhelming suffering despite excellent pal-liative care, the End of Life Consensus Panel of the Amer-
ican College of Physicians and the American Society of
Internal Medicine concluded, “In legal application, the
biggest stumbling block is the physician’s intention:
whether it is the relief of suffering (legal) or the active
hastening of death (illegal).”7 It is becoming generally
accepted that when a physician extubates a terminally ill
patient in irreversible respiratory failure by request, the
physician is not introducing a new pathology as a cause of
death; that pathology is already present and is then permit-
ted to run its natural course without further intervention.
We argue that in deactivating the pacemaker, the surgeon is
not introducing a new pathology; the patient’s existing
heart disease is being allowed to complete its course.8 Our
patient’s response to the physician who says he cannot
consent to a harmful procedure will likely be that the
greater harm is done by prolonging his continued pain and
suffering, and the lesser, by relieving it. Nevertheless, no
turn of logic can escape the fact that deactivating this
patient’s pacemaker will very likely result in his death within
48 hours. If a physician’s conscience simply cannot accept
that relief of even the most intense and intractable suffering
can be ethically purchased at such a price, then an impasse
has been reached between the patient’s conception of his
needs and best interests and the physician’s. Referral to
another physician better prepared to work with this patient
should then be considered.9
In the tightly circumscribed conditions described, we
recommend option A over option E as the most ethically
sound course. Because a competent adult patient autono-
mously requests deactivation of the pacemaker, has made
the request after long consideration and a careful judgment
about his negative quality of life, and is fully aware of the
consequences of doing so, the surgeon’s responsibility to
preserve life becomes properly secondary to respect for the
patient’s autonomy, concern for the magnitude of his suf-
fering, and empathy for the qualitative futility of continu-
ing to support his life with medical technology.
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